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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the conceptual structure of domestic
violence and critiques various influential accounts of domestic
violence operating in the criminal justice system, legal and sociologi-
cal academia, and the domestic violence advocacy community. Part
I presents a preliminary philosophical analysis of domestic violence
with the goal of furthering our understanding of the correct use of
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this concept. This analysis centers around three key elements of
domestic violence: violence, domesticity, and structural inequality.
Part II develops an explanatory model of domestic violence based
upon these key elements. Part III examines and critiques four
principal accounts of domestic violence, each of which reflects the
conflicting ways in which the concept of domestic violence is used in
the language and methodology of the criminal justice, academic, and
advocacy communities. Finally this article endorses an account of
domestic violence that roughly corresponds to the one employed in
the recent work of sociologist Michael Johnson.
INTRODUCTION
"T7he current debate about the use of and over-
reliance on the criminal justice system [in address-
ing domestic violence] is serious and important. If
discussed employing a full and accurate definition
of domestic violence ... its resolution can greatly
strengthen current efforts to eliminate domestic
violence."
-Jody Raphael1
This article analyzes the conceptual structure of domestic
violence with the goal of promoting a better understanding of this
concept and several of its related concepts. The analysis set forth in
this article provides a strong conceptual grounding upon which to
understand domestic violence and thereby to advance current
debates regarding the criminal justice system's response to domestic
violence offenses.2
Academic literature has aired two sets of lively, extensive, and
often heated debates regarding domestic violence in recent decades.
The first debate has appeared in the sociological literature for
nearly three decades and addresses the issue of gender prevalence
in domestic violence.3 The second debate has appeared in legal
1. Jody Raphael, Rethinking Criminal Justice Responses to Intimate Partner
Violence, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1354, 1361 (2004).
2. The analysis set forth in this article need not be limited to the criminal justice
system's responses to domestic violence, but within this context an answer to the
question of what counts as domestic violence may prove most helpful in furthering
debates regarding matters such as pro-arrest policies and mandatory victim
participation in domestic violence prosecutions. See infra note 4.
3. 'Gender prevalence' herein refers to the rate at which males commit domestic
violence against females as compared to the rate at which females commit domestic
violence against males. Suzanne Steinmetz sparked the debate regarding gender
prevalence in domestic violence by claiming in her early work to document the allegedly
widespread phenomenon of "husband battering." Suzanne K. Steinmetz, The Battered
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literature for nearly two decades and addresses the question of how
the criminal justice system should respond to domestic violence
cases in which the victim does not want the suspected offender to be
arrested and/or later requests that charges be dismissed.4 Oddly, the
Husband Syndrome, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 499, 499 (1978). Some key works in the sociological
debate regarding gender prevalence in domestic violence include: R. EMERSON DOBASH
& RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY (1979)
[hereinafter DOBASH & DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES]; Richard Berk et al., Mutual
Combat and Other Family Violence Myths, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT
FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 197 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983); Dawn H. Currie,
Violent Men or Violent Women: Whose Definition Counts?, in ISSUES IN INTIMATE
VIOLENCE 97 (Raquel Kennedy Bergen ed., 1998); Shamita Das Dasgupta, Just Like
Men? A Critical View of Violence by Women, in COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSES
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LESSONS FROM DULUTH AND BEYOND 195 (Melanie F. Shepard
& Ellen L. Pence eds., 1999); Russell P. Dobash & R. Emerson Dobash, The Context-
Specific Approach, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE
RESEARCH, supra, at 261 [hereinafter Dobash & Dobash, The Context-SpecificApproach];
Russell P. Dobash & R. Emerson Dobash, Women's Violence to Men in Intimate
Relationships: Working on a Puzzle, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 324 (2004) [hereinafter
Dobash & Dobash, Women's Violence to Men]; Ann Grady, Female-on-Male Domestic
Abuse: Uncommon or Ignored?, in NEW VISIONS OF CRIME VICTIMS 71 (Carolyn Hoyle &
Richard Young eds., 2002); Holly Johnson, Rethinking Survey Research on Violence
Against Women, in RETHINKING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 23 (R. Emerson Dobash &
Russell P. Dobash eds., 1998); Gayla Margolin, The Multiple Forms of Aggressiveness
Between Marital Partners: How Do We Identify Them?, 13 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY
77 (1987); Daniel G. Saunders, Wife Abuse, Husband Abuse, or Mutual Combat?: A
Feminist Perspective on the Empirical Findings, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE
ABUSE 90 (Kersti Yll & Michele Bograd eds., 1988); Murray A. Straus, Injury and
Frequency of Assault and the 'Representative Sample Fallacy"in Measuring Wife Beating
and Child Abuse, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 75 (Murray A. Straus
& Richard J. Gelles eds., 1990) [hereinafter Straus, Injury and Frequency]; Murray A.
Straus, The Controversy over Domestic Violence by Women: A Methodological,
Theoretical, and Sociology of Science Analysis, in VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS
17 (Ximena B. Arriaga & Stuart Oskamp eds., 1999) [hereinafter Straus, Domestic
Violence by Women]; Kersti A. Yll, Through a Feminist Lens: Gender, Power, and
Violence, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 47 (Richard J. Gelles &
Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993) [hereinafter Y116, Through a Feminist Lens]; Kersti Y116,
Using a Feminist Approach in Quantitative Research: A Case Study, in THE DARK SIDE
OFFAMIIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH, supra, at 277 [hereinafter Yll6,
Using a Feminist Approach]; WALTER S. DEKESEREDY & MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ, NATL
ONLINE RESOURCE CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, MEASURING THE EXTENT OF
WOMAN ABUSE IN INTIMATE HETEROSEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONFLICT
TACTICS SCALES (1998), http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/ResearchfVAWnet
Docs/AR_ctscrit.pdf.
4. The legal debate has focused on the propriety of pro-arrest or mandatory arrest
policies, whereby the suspect is arrested irrespective of the victim's wishes, and 'no-drop'
policies, whereby charges are prosecuted irrespective of the victim's request to dismiss.
San Diego, California, first adopted such policies in the mid-1980s. See generally CASEY
G. GWINN & ANNE O'DELL, NAVL CTR. ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, STOPPING
THE VIOLENCE: THE ROLE OF THE POLICE OFFICER AND THE PROSECUTOR (1992),
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/StoppingViolence.pdf. Recent debates regarding such
policies have taken the form of (often scathing) critiques of Linda Mills's controversial
work, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE (2003). For
critique and discussion of Mills's work, see Annalise Acorn, Surviving the Battered
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Reader's Syndrome, or: A Critique of Linda G. Mills' Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our
Responses to Intimate Abuse, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 335 (2005); Donna Coker, Race,
Poverty, and the Crime-Centered Response to Domestic Violence, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1331 (2004) [hereinafter Coker, Race, Poverty, and the Crime-Centered
Response]; Walter S. DeKeseredy, Book Review, 44. BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 621 (2004);
Raphael, supra note 1; Evan Stark, Insults, Injury, and Injustice: Rethinking State
Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1302 (2004).
Literature concerning the broader debate regarding such policies includes ELIZABETH
M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000); Mary E. Asmus,
Tineke Ritmeester & Ellen L. Pence, Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth:
Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics ofAbusive
Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115 (1991); Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Arrest
Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201 (1992); Natalie
Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and Perpetuating
Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (1987); Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist
Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801
(2001); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1043-1046 (2000); Dasgupta, supra
note 3; David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters:
Process, Problems, and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS
AND EVALUATION 157 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993); Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do
We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered
Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2004); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1996); Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550 (1999); Christine O'Connor, Domestic Violence No-
Contact Orders and the Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937 (1999); Melanie
Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of "Ideal Victims": Assaulted Women's
"Image Problems" in Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 107 (2004); Arthur L. Rizer III,
Mandatory Arrest: Do We Need to Take a Closer Look?, 36 UWLA L. REV. 1 (2005); Emily
J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence
Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657 (2004); Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step
Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533
(1996); Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or
Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133 (1994); Donna Wills,
Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 173
(1997); Cathleen A. Booth, Note, No-Drop Policies: Effective Legislation or Protectionist
Attitude?, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 621 (1999); Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Polices in the
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 853 (1994); Jessica Dayton, Note, The Silencing of a Woman's Choice:
Mandatory Arrest and No Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 281 (2003); Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop
Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159
(2003); Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State:
The Need for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997); Nichole Miras
Mordini, Note, Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases; An
Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295 (2004);
Kalyani Robbins, Note, No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence: Just Good Policy, or
Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1999); Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Note,
A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender in Domestic
Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171 (1994); Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for
Domestic Violence: Why It May Prove the Best First Step in Curbing Repeat Abuse, CRIM.
JUST., Fall 1995, at 2; Anannya Bhattacharjee, Whose Safety?: Women of Color and the
Violence of Law Enforcement (May 2001) (unpublished Justice Visions working paper),
available at http://www.afsc.org/community/WhoseSafety.pdf.
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sociological debate has had little significant influence on the legal
debate.5 One possible reason for this lack of academic cross-
fertilization may be that the sociological debate has largely centered
on the issue of research methodology.' Sociological literature under-
stands the question of what counts as domestic violence principally
as a methodological question of how sociologists ought to measure
domestic violence.7 Many legal academics are seemingly reluctant
to engage with questions of sociological research methods,' and
perhaps for this reason legal academic literature has failed to
employ insights developed in the sociological literature to examine
the underlying conceptual question of what counts as domestic
violence. This failure is regrettable, and this article is one step
towards its rectification.
The step taken in this article is admittedly preliminary, and
any fully developed theory of domestic violence or social policy
responding to domestic violence will require a great deal of further
explication.9 As such, this article does not aim to settle the existing
legal or sociological debates regarding domestic violence. Rather, its
aim is simply to set forth a clearly developed conceptual analysis of
domestic violence: one that may bring clarity to the existing legal
debates. Specifically, as a project of conceptual analysis, this article
Such policies, and the debates they engender, are increasingly present in England. See
SusAN S.M. EDWARDS, POLICING 'DOMESTIC' VIOLENCE: WOMEN, THE LAW AND THE STATE
(1989); CAROLYN HOYLE, NEGOTIATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: POLICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND VICTIMS (1998); Louise Ellison, Prosecuting Domestic Violence Without Victim
Participation, 65 MOD. L. REV. 834 (2002); Louise Ellison, Responding to Victim
Withdrawal in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 2003 CRIM. L. REV. 760 (2003); Carolyn
Hoyle & Andrew Sanders, Police Response to Domestic Violence: From Victim Choice to
Victim Empowerment?, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 14 (2000).
5. While the sociological debates are noted in one recent law review article, its
author fails to take seriously the conceptual issues that underlie this conflict and,
instead, simply assumes that family violence researchers have accurately captured the
"empirical reality" of domestic violence. Linda Kelly, Disabusing the Definition of
Domestic Abuse: How Women Batter Men and the Role of the Feminist State, 30 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 791, 793 (2003). For discussion of family violence researchers, see infra Part
III.B.
6. See supra note 3.
7. See supra note 3.
8. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
On the potential to overcome such reluctance by integrating methodologies based on
various disciplines within law school faculties, see David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-Based
Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2003).
9. This article is part of a larger project regarding the criminal prosecution of
domestic violence, which explores the intrinsic value prosecutorial decisions may have
in making a society less patriarchal and the relevance of this value to the proper exercise
of prosecutorial discretion in domestic violence cases. Michelle Madden Dempsey,
Domestic Violence and the Uncooperative Victim: Rethinking the Purpose of Criminal
Prosecution (forthcoming) (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University) (on file with
author).
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aims to do the following: to take an idea, specifically the concept of
domestic violence, and to break it down into its constituent parts.
The purpose of this analysis is not merely to track linguistic usage
or to stipulate a meaning of domestic violence, but rather to explain
what is important about domestic violence and to "establish an
evaluative test" for the concept."°
This article does not express an opinion on the question of
whether the criminal law should seek to set domestic violence
offenses apart, for example, by specifically prohibiting 'domestic
battery."' However, the belief that domestic violence offenses call
for a distinct conceptual analysis clearly underlies this article's
approach. This belief is in keeping with the observation that not all
crimes are "covered by a single moral map."' 2 What follows can be
understood, therefore, as an exercise in the moral cartography of
domestic violence: it provides a moral map that can, in part, guide
the exercise of criminal justice policy in such cases.
This article proceeds in three parts. The first part unpacks
three conceptual elements that constitute domestic violence:
violence, domesticity, and structural inequality. The second part
employs these three conceptual elements to develop an explanatory
model of domestic violence. The final part uses this explanatory
model to clarify and critique three influential accounts of domestic
violence: the violence account, the domestic account, and the
structural inequality account, and to explain and defend a fourth
account of domestic violence, Johnson's account.
I. THREE ELEMENTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Domestic violence is best understood in terms of three distinct
elements: violence, domesticity, and structural inequality.
A. Violence
Many accounts of violence "incorporate some strong notion of
illegitimacy into the very meaning of violence," " and some go so far
as to equate all violence with normative illegitimacy. Such accounts
10. Brian Bix, Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence, 1 LEGAL THEORY 465, 479
(1995).
11. For further analysis, see generally Victor Tadros, The Distinctiveness of Domestic
Abuse: A Freedom-Based Account, in DEFINING CRIMES 119 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green
eds., 2005).
12. John Gardner, Crime: In Proportion and Perspective, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
SENTENCING THEORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW VON HIRSCH 31, 48 (Andrew
Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998).
13. C.A.J. Coady, The Idea of Violence, 3 J. APPLIED PHIL. 3, 3 (1986).
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are referred to herein as legitimist accounts. The account of violence
set forth in this article rejects legitimist accounts of violence. In
order to explain clearly what is being rejected, the next two sections
will examine two leading types of legitimist accounts of violence.
1. Traditional Legitimist Accounts
The first account of violence to be considered is referred to
herein as the traditional legitimist accounts of violence. Two aspects
of such accounts are worth noting at this point: (1) they conceive of
all violence as illegitimate by definition; and (2) they adopt a narrow
conception of what counts as violence, typically restricting their
focus to the direct, physical use of force.'4
Traditional legitimist accounts are prevalent in philosophical
literature, where they typically come in one of three flavors: political
legitimist accounts, legal legitimist accounts, and moral legitimist
accounts. For example, Stanage bases his account of violence on its
political illegitimacy, claiming that violence is best understood in
the context of a political civil order, and that violent acts are by
definition "dis-order[ed and] un-civil." 5 In contrast, Hook conceptu-
alizes violence on the basis of its legal or moral illegitimacy,
defining violence as "the 'illegal' or 'immoral' use of... force." 6
Traditional legitimist accounts of violence do not always make
explicit the normative framework upon which claims of illegitimacy
are based. For example, Girvetz offers a traditional legitimist
account of violence by defining violence as "illegitimate and
unsanctioned acts" but he fails to identify what system of norms
make these acts illegitimate and unsanctioned.1v
This article rejects legitimist accounts of violence for reasons
explained in Part I.A.3. It does, however, use the concept of
illegitimacy to further its analysis, by dividing categories of action
into the legitimate and illegitimate. Thus, this article must answer
the question that Girvetz did not 8 and clearly specify the normative
system invoked by relying on the concept of legitimacy. The
normative system invoked herein is that of morality. In other words,
when an act is described as legitimate or illegitimate, it is used in
14. See id. at 4-5.
15. Sherman M. Stanage, Violatives: Modes and Themes of Violence, in REASON AND
VIOLENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 207, 226 (Sherman M. Stanage ed., 1975).
16. SIDNEY HOOK, REVOLUTION, REFORM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 225 (1976).
17. Harry Girvetz, An Anatomy of Violence, in REASON AND VIOLENCE: PHILO-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 15, at 183, 185.
18. See id.
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the sense that it is morally legitimate or illegitimate.19 This article
does not attempt to develop or defend any particular set of moral
norms. Rather, it only attempts to develop a model within which
competing accounts of domestic violence and the conflicting sets of
moral norms that form the basis of these accounts can be better
understood.
2. Structuralist Accounts
The second legitimist account of violence to be considered is
referred to herein as the structuralist account. Two aspects of such
accounts are worth noting: (1) they conceive of all violence as
illegitimate by definition, and for that reason they are examples of
legitimist accounts of violence, and (2) they adopt a broad view of
what counts as violence, including both the direct, physical use of
force (personal violence) and the existence of structural inequalities
(structural violence).2 ° Thus, under a structuralist account of
violence, structural inequality is, by definition, violence.2'
Notable among the structuralist accounts is Galtung's founda-
tional work on peace and violence, wherein he claims that all unjust
social conditions, such as poverty, are best understood as forms of
violence.22 Galtung's point in characterizing structural inequality as
violence appears to be to launch a normative attack against such
inequality - to claim that it is by definition normatively illegiti-
mate. The logic goes something like this: all violence is bad; all
structural inequality is violence; therefore, all structural inequality
is bad. The first premise derives from traditional legitimist accounts
of violence, the second premise marks the structuralist accounts'
unique contribution to the analysis of violence, and the conclusion
reflects the political awakening that advocates of structuralist
accounts seek to achieve.
This article rejects structuralist accounts of violence for reasons
explained in Part II.A.3. The concept of structural inequality,
however, furthers the analysis of domestic violence set forth herein,
by including structural inequality as a necessary element of
domestic violence in its strong sense.23
19. The discussion here may suggest too strict a division between normative systems
such as law, politics, and morality. This discussion is not meant to suggest that these
systems properly can be understood as conceptually unrelated, but further discussion
of this matter is beyond the scope of this article.
20. See, e.g., Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES.
167, 168 (1969).
21. Id. at 171. See also Coady, supra note 13, at 4.
22. See Galtung, supra note 20, at 170-71.
23. See infra Part II.
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3. Critique of Legitimist Accounts
This article rejects the first premise of legitimist accounts of
violence, which claims that all violence is normatively illegitimate.
This premise conflates normative and empirical accounts of violence
and, in doing so, creates two problems. The first problem arises
when legitimist accounts attempt to identify what counts as violence
as an empirical matter, based on their understanding of violence as
a normative (illegitimate) matter.24 Working from the normative to
the empirical obscures important ways in which the concept of
violence actually functions in the English language. For example,
shooting and killing someone typically is understood as a violent
act, while the question of its normative legitimacy is a distinct issue.
Thus, a person who shoots and kills an attacker in self-defense is
one who has committed a violent but legitimate act. Conversely,
beginning with the normative assessment and using that to control
an empirical assessment prevents an understanding of the act of
shooting and killing a person as violent." The legitimist accounts'
inability to conceptualize such an act as violent renders these
accounts useless in understanding the concept of violence in the way
the concept is used in the criminal justice system.
The second problem mirrors the first and crops up when
legitimist accounts attempt to identify what counts as violence as a
normative (illegitimate) matter, based on their understanding of
violence as an empirical matter.26 Working from the empirical to the
normative without stopping along the way to conduct an independ-
ent normative evaluation of the act in question leads to a tremen-
dous amount of question-begging in legitimist accounts of violence.
Since legitimist accounts view all violence as illegitimate by
definitional fiat,27 they ignore the fundamental normative question
of whether a certain act, described empirically, should be considered
normatively illegitimate.
This article also rejects the second premise of the structuralist
accounts of violence, which claims that all structural inequalities
are violence. While structuralist accounts provide a compelling tool
in progressive political discourse as a means of challenging precon-
ceived notions regarding the legitimacy of social conditions and of
motivating society to awaken to and perhaps remedy unjust
24. See Coady, supra note 13, at 13.
25. E.g., Galtung, supra note 20, at 168-69 (claiming that people killed by an
earthquake do not die a violent death).
26. See Coady, supra note 13, at 4-5.
27. See id. at 3.
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inequalities, little is gained from conflating the concepts of struc-
tural inequality and violence. Rather, violence and structural
inequality are best understood as distinct concepts, albeit ones that
are often related. Moreover, in terms of reflecting common usage
and facilitating the joining of issue with policymakers, structuralist
accounts of violence are unsatisfying insofar as they fail to reflect
the way the concept of violence is used in the criminal justice
system.
4. A Proposed Non-Legitimist, Narrow Account of Violence
This article proposes that violence can be best understood under
a non-legitimist, narrow account. This account of violence does two
things: (1) it creates conceptual space in which to understand vio-
lence as either legitimate or illegitimate, and (2) it adopts a narrow
view of what counts as violence, focusing on the direct, physical use
of force.
First, the account of violence proposed here includes both
legitimate violence and illegitimate violence. Specifically, under this
account, violence is merely a prima facie wrong, the doing of which
can be justified, all things considered.28 In this sense, this proposed
account is consistent with Coady's view "that resort to violence even
when morally justifiable should commonly be regarded as a matter
for regret." 29
Second, the account of violence proposed here rejects the notion
of structural violence and instead conceives of violence narrowly, as
the direct, physical use of force. The use of the word 'direct' implies
a rejection of Harris's broad account of responsibility, wherein the
failure to prevent violence is understood as doing violence.3 ° The use
of the word 'physical' is meant to reinforce a rejection of the notion
of structural violence, in which violence is understood in terms of
states of affairs rather than actions.3 Note, however, that the use
of the word 'physical' is not meant to suggest any requirement that
violent acts result in injury or damage, such as bruising, for
example. In other words, violent acts are no less violent for their
28. For a detailed discussion of the concept of justification, see John Gardner,
Justification and Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 103 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith
eds., 1996).
29. Coady, supra note 13, at 17.
30. See JOHN HARRIS, VIOLENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 24-47 (1980). The ascription of
responsibility for omissions (or negative actions) is beyond the scope of this article.
Rather, this article primarily addresses violent acts rather than omissions.
31. See Galtung, supra note 20, at 175.
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failure to cause injury or damage. 2 Finally, the use of the word
'force' in this article means the exertion of energy or strength upon
an object.33 In this sense, a storm can besaid to be violent, but as
the topic here is criminal law, this article focuses on the ways in
which people are violent.
Before moving on, this article's use of the term 'violence' should
be distinguished from its use of the term 'abuse,'34 The concept of
abuse serves as an umbrella category that includes both violent
abuse and nonviolent abuse. Further, some forms of violence can be
understood as members of a completely distinct category from
abuse, in that there exists a category of nonabusive violence.3
B. Domesticity
What makes violence into domestic violence? One tempting but
not terribly illuminating approach to answering this question is the
'recipe approach': simply take the concept of violence, add domestic-
ity, and mix. This approach is both incomplete and conceptually
inadequate, but this section does not address these issues.36 Rather,
this section clarifies the meaning of the term 'domesticity' and
unpacks the reasons why domesticity is relevant to understanding
domestic violence.
Domesticity is simply "the quality or state of being domestic" or
possessing a "domestic character." 37 What does it mean for violence
to possess a domestic character? This question is addressed below
by examining two common ways of characterizing the difference
between domestic and nondomestic violence, or 'generic violence.'
1. Location
One way to differentiate domestic violence from generic violence
is to focus on the location in which the violence occurs. Although no
statutory provisions or government policies in the United States or
32. Contra Coady, supra note 13, at 15 (adopting a definition of violence that requires
"injury on or damage to persons or property").
33. This definition of "force" coincides with its meaning in the Oxford English
Dictionary. 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 33-35 (2d ed. 1989).
34. This distinction is elaborated and clarified in Part III.
35. Violent self-defense is an example of nonabusive violence.
36. The incompleteness of this approach is illuminated in the discussion of the final
element of domestic violence (structural inequality) in Part I.C. The conceptual
inadequacy of the recipe approach is addressed in Part II, which builds an explanatory
model of domestic violence that examines the various relationships that exist between
elements of domestic violence, rather than simply mixing all of the elements together.
37. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 945.
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England define domestic violence by reference to its physical
location, the relevance of location to understanding domestic vio-
lence is reflected in government reports and academic literature
that characterize domestic violence as "violence in the home."38
Why might the location of the violence be relevant to under-
standing what counts as domestic violence? One possible answer to
this question points to the location of the home as a "private"
sphere, where people's conduct is protected from external scrutiny.39
Under this account, generic violence is conceptualized as "public"
violence and domestic violence is conceptualized as "private"
violence.4 ° Paradigms of generic violence occur in "public" locations,
such as pubs or streets; whereas paradigms of domestic violence
occur in "private" spaces, such as the home.41 Historically, the
public-private dichotomy has been used as a basis on which to
prevent criminal prosecution of domestic violence, even where
victims actively sought assistance from the criminal justice
system.42 More recently, however, with increasing criminal justice
intervention into domestic violence, particularly in cases where the
victim requests assistance, the historical conception of domestic
violence as a private matter has been eroded.43
Another possible reason why location might be relevant to
understanding what counts as domestic violence is the symbolic
38. E.g., Richard J. Gelles, Family Violence, 11 ANN. REV. Soc. 347, 348 (1985); HER
MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARIES & HER MAJESTY'S CROWN PROSECUTION
SERVICE INSPECTORATE, VIOLENCE AT HOME: THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
CASESINVOLVING DOMESTICVIOLENCE 4,6, 19 (2004), http://www.hmcpsi.gov.uk/reports/
DomVioO104Rep.pdf; SAFETY, HEALTH AND EMPLOYEE WELFARE DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRICULTURE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AWARENESS HANDBOOK (2005), http://www.usda.gov/
da/shmd/aware.htm.
39. See KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN THE LAW 11 (1985).
40. See, e.g., Donileen R. Loseke & Richard J. Gelles, Introduction: Examining and
Evaluating Controversies on Family Vwlence, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at ix-x (describing family violence as '"private family matters"').
The public-private dichotomy has been widely critiqued in feminist legal theory. See, e.g.,
CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Susan
B. Boyd ed., 1997); FEMINISM, THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE (Joan B. Landes ed., 1998);
Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice?: Pornography and the Public/Private Dichotomy, in
FEMINIST THEORY AND LEGAL STRATEGY 93 (Anne Bottomley & Joanne Conaghan eds.,
1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 168-69
(1989); O'DONOVAN, supra note 39; PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES
(Margaret Thornton ed., 1995).
41. See RICHARD J. GELLES, THE VIOLENT HOME: A STUDY OF AGGRESSION BETWEEN
HUSBANDS AND WIVES 93 (1974).
42. See EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 49-51.
43. See HOYLE, supra note 4, at 2-7.
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significance of the home as a place of comfort, safety, and pro-
tection.44 As Gardner and Shute have noted with regard to rape,
"[o]ften the special symbolism of a particular act or class of acts is
tied to the particular symbolism of acts which are regarded as their
moral opposites." 45 When violence occurs within the home, symboliz-
ing comfort, safety, and protection, a moral opposition between
'home as danger' and 'home as protection' results. Thus, to the
extent that home-based violence is the symbolic antithesis of safety
and security in the home, location becomes important to under-
standing the concept of domestic violence.
2. Relationship of Parties
An equally fruitful way to differentiate domestic violence from
generic violence is to focus on the nature of the relationship between
the parties. In generic violence, the parties typically have no pre-
existing relationship; whereas, in domestic violence, the parties
necessarily stand in a domestic relationship, typically characterized
by intimacy, familial ties, or a shared household.46 Focusing on the
nature of the relationship between the parties is the most common
way of differentiating domestic violence from generic violence in
U.S. and English law.47 The relevant types of relationships have
been defined in a number of ways, more or less broadly. The most
common way of defining a domestic relationship in U.S. statutes is
in terms of a "family or household member,"4" which typically
includes relationships between spouses, parents and children,
siblings, and current or former intimate partners.49 The definition
less frequently includes extended familial relations, for example,
44. See, e.g., Loseke & Gelles, supra note 40, at x ("In a society such as ours....
houses and families are often idealized as havens . ..
45. John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 193, 210 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000) (examining the particular signifi-
cance of sexual penetration in understanding the wrongness of rape).
46. See 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 944 (defining "domestic"
as "intimate, familiar, 'at home').
47. See, e.g., ROGER BIRD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 2003)
(discussing the concept of association as an element of domestic violence in English civil
law); NANCY KID. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAw 725 (2001) (quoting Victoria F.
Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women
Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1996)).
48. E.g., ARK. CODEANN. § 9-15-103(2) (2006) (defining "domestic abuse"); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 18291(a) (Deering 2005) (defining "domestic violence"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.28(2) (LexisNexis 2006) (defining "domestic violence"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
5202(1) (2005) (defining "domestic violence"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(3) (2005)
(defining "domestic abuse").
49. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2005).
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up to fourth degree consanguinity;' platonic roommates;"l and the
relationship between elderly or disabled persons and their care-
givers.52
Why might the relationship between the parties be relevant to
understanding what counts as domestic violence? Two answers
present themselves, each of which tracks the discussion above
regarding the relevance of the location of the violence. First,
domestic relationships carry strong connotations of privacy that
transcend the physical location of the parties at any given
moment."3 Second, the special symbolism of physical affection within
many domestic relations, and its contrast with physical violence in
such relationships, may explain the particular relevance of the
relationship in conceptualizing domestic violence. 4 Insofar as a
loving touch, hug, or kiss represents the ideal expression of physical
affection between romantic partners or parents and children, this
may explain why, when replaced by a slap or punch, such violence
is considered particularly problematic.
C. Structural Inequality
This section explains the concept of structural inequality and
highlights two key underlying concepts in order to understand what,
if any, role structural inequality plays in understanding domestic
violence. Subsequent sections employ the concept of structural
inequality to delineate two types of domestic violence and to
highlight the differences between competing accounts of domestic
violence.
1. Unpacking Structural Inequality
Structural inequalities are a function of social structures. Social
structures are the "sets of rules and principles that govern activities
in the different domains of social life."55 When social structures
sustain or perpetuate the uneven distribution of social power, they
50. E.g., id. § 18.66.990(4)(E).
51. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2005) (defining "domestic violence").
52. E.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(6) (West 2005) (defining "domestic
violence").
53. See, e.g., Loseke & Gelles, supra note 40, at ix (emphasizing "the value of secrecy
in maintaining a public image of respectability" with regard to family matters).
54. See Gardner & Shute, supra note 45, at 210.
55. ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY ONLINE VERSION 2.0, http://www.rep.
routledge.com/article/R036SECT1 (Edward Craig ed.) (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
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can be understood as structural inequalities.5 6 Structural inequali-
ties inform our practical understanding regarding the way the world
works by providing a context for recognizing which people generally
hold power in relation to which other people.57 Like acts of violence,
acts which tend to sustain or perpetuate structural inequalities
constitute prima facie wrongs, but they have the potential (at least
analytically) to be rendered justifiable, all things considered.58 That
said, what follows is based in part on the belief that most (if not all)
structural inequalities are usually unjustifiable, all things consid-
ered, as in the paradigmatic examples of racism and patriarchy.59
2. Power and Control
There are two key concepts that underlie structural inequality:
power and control." Power is the ability or entitlement to exercise
control over another person.6' In any relationship, the more
powerful person may use his or her power as an instrument of
control over the less powerful person. Power, in the sense employed
herein, is an inherently social concept. As Arendt has observed:
Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a
group .... When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we
actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of
people .... [P] otestas in populo, without a people or group there
is no power .... 62
56. See YVES R. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 207 (1951),
available at http://www.nd.edu/Departments.Maritain/etext/pdg.htm.
57. See Galtung, supra note 20, at 175.
58. Gardner, supra note 28, at 107-08. The realm of justifiable structural inequality
is arguably quite limited, for example, to the adult-child inequality. John Stuart Mill,
The Subjection of Women, in MILL: TEXTS, COMMENTARIES 133 (Alan Ryan ed., W.W.
Norton & Co.) (1997). Some commentators, however, claim that even this inequality is
unjustifiable. See, e.g., SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 72-104 (1970);
Christine Parton, Women, Gender Oppression and Child Abuse, in TAKING CHILD ABUSE
SERIOUSLY: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CHILD PROTECTION THEORYAND PRACTICE 41 (The
Violence Against Children Study Group ed., 1990). This article does not fully explore the
adult-child inequality or parent-child domestic violence.
59. For a detailed account of patriarchy as unjustified inequality, see SYLVIA WALBY,
THEORIZING PATRIARCHY (1990).
60. See The Duluth Abuse Intervention Project, The Power and Control Wheel,
http://www.duluth-model.org/documents/PhyVio.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2006) [herein-
after Duluth Abuse Intervention Project].
61. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 44 (1970), cited in Stanage, supra note 15,
at 225-26.
62. Id.
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If one accepts Arendt's social account of power, it makes sense
to conceptualize structural inequalities in any given relationship in
terms of the relevant social group or groups to which the individuals
belong. This article accepts Arendt's account, but in doing so, does
not intend to essentialize diverse people's experiences of structural
inequalities.63 Rather, acceptance of this account merely reflects the
belief that there is something useful to be gained from working with
concepts based on social groups such as "women" and "men," and in
recognizing that social power is often granted or denied on the basis
of one's membership in various social groups.64
II. AN EXPLANATORY MODEL OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
This section presents an explanatory model of domestic violence
using the three elements previously examined. This model presents
a philosophical analysis of domestic violence and several key related
concepts and provides a framework within which to explain and
critique leading accounts of domestic violence.
A. Constructing the Model
The model consists of four spheres. Three intersecting spheres
represent the elements discussed in Part I: violence, domesticity,
and structural inequality. Each of these three spheres represents an
array of acts, any of which can be characterized respectively as 'a
violent act,' 'an act taking place in a domestic context,' and 'an act
which tends to sustain or perpetuate structural inequality.' The
fourth sphere cuts across all three of these intersecting elements
and delineates acts that are, all things considered, legitimate from
those that are illegitimate. This fourth sphere is called the 'sphere
of moral illegitimacy.' Illegitimate acts fall within this sphere, while
legitimate acts fall outside this sphere. The outline of this sphere is
presented as a broken line, which represents the contested nature
of the moral judgments attributed to many of the concepts that fall
at the sphere's edges and penumbra. The intersections of the
various spheres create space for thirteen distinct conceptual
63. Other works have addressed these complexities more fully. See, e.g., Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); Sandra Fredman & Erika
Szyszczak, The Interaction of Race and Gender, in DIscRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAW
214 (Bob Hepple & Erika Szyszczak eds., 1992).
64. See CATHARINEA. MACKINNON, FEMINISMUNMODIFIED 166-70 (1987). MacKinnon
correctly observes that "the status of masculinity [and femininity] . . . is accorded to
[people] on the basis of their biology but is not itself biological." Id. at 170.
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categories. A number (1-13) appears in each space, and each number
represents a concept of, or related to, domestic violence.
This explanatory model of domestic violence is depicted below:
B. Using the Model
This model identifies thirteen distinct conceptual categories of
action of, or relating to, domestic violence. Each of these categories
is discussed in the following list which corresponds to the numbers
located within each conceptual space. The numbered items provide
brief accounts of domestic violence and key related concepts, and
examples of the actions represented by each concept in the model.
Where appropriate, the labels applied to the various concepts
hereinafter are also noted.
This model serves two purposes: (1) it enables an explanation
in Part III of the nature of the disagreements that exist in the
literature regarding the correct use of the concept of domestic
violence, and (2) it presents a philosophical analysis of domestic
violence and some key related concepts, which reflects the correct
use of these concepts. In other words, it attempts to draw distinc-
tions that correspond to empirical reality and objective morality, as
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opposed to distinctions based merely on stipulation. Although the
model provides space for thirteen concepts, it should not be assumed
that every conceptual category corresponds to an existing usage,
empirical reality, and/or objective morality. Some numbers, as
discussed herein, may simply reflect empty categories: conceptual
place-holders that assist in making distinctions but do not accu-
rately account (empirically or morally) for the way in which concepts
are or should be used.
Ultimately, this model is meant to provide a framework for
explaining and critiquing rival accounts of domestic violence. The
assistance of a clear conceptual model hopefully will facilitate better
understanding and critique of the leading accounts of domestic
violence and will facilitate a stronger appreciation of the assump-
tions and values that underlie current debates regarding the
criminal justice system's response to such cases.
1. This category includes violent acts occurring in a domestic
context that tend to sustain or perpetuate structural inequality and
are, all things considered, illegitimate. This concept is 'domestic
violence in its strong sense.' The classic paradigm of domestic
violence in its strong sense is "wife beating." 5
2. This category includes violent acts occurring in a non-
domestic context that tend to sustain or perpetuate structural
inequality and are, all things considered, illegitimate. Examples of
this category include lynching, gay-bashing, and stranger rape.
3. This category includes violent acts occurring in a domestic
context that do not tend to sustain or perpetuate structural
inequality but are, all things considered, illegitimate. This concept
is 'domestic violence in its weak sense.' Examples may include a
slap by a woman on her male partner's cheek to convey offense, and
the actions of a victim of domestic violence in its strong sense who
engages in violent retaliation against his or her abuser.
4. This category includes nonviolent acts occurring in a domes-
tic context that tend to sustain or perpetuate structural inequality
and are, all things considered, illegitimate. This concept will be
referred to as 'domestic abuse.' Examples of domestic abuse include
a refusal to allow an abused person contact with friends or family,
demands to know the abused person's location and companions at
65. On the topic of wife beating generally, see Glenda Kaufman Kantor & Murray A.
Straus, The "Drunken Bum" Theory of Wife Beating, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN
FAMILIES, supra note 3, at 203. For a critique of Straus's account of domestic violence
and his research methodology, see infra Part III.B.
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all times, or a refusal to allow the abused person to work outside the
home or have access to money or other necessities.6"
5. This category includes nonviolent acts occurring in non-
domestic context that tend to sustain or perpetuate structural
inequality and are, all things considered, illegitimate. Examples
include the telling of a sexist, racist, or homophobic joke in the
workplace or other nonphysical sexual or racial harassment.
6. This category includes violent acts occurring outside of a
domestic context that do not tend to sustain or perpetuate struc-
tural inequality but are, all things considered, illegitimate. This
concept fits the notion of 'generic violence.' A paradigm of generic
violence is a pub brawl.6 "
7. This category includes nonviolent acts occurring in a
domestic context that do not tend to sustain or perpetuate struc-
tural inequality but are, all things considered, illegitimate. This
concept will be referred to as 'domestic conflict.' Examples include
situations where people lose their temper with their domestic
partners or family members because they are annoyed, in a bad
mood, or tired.
8. This category includes nonviolent acts occurring in a
domestic context that tend to sustain or perpetuate structural
inequality but are, all things considered, legitimate. Some would
claim that this is an empty conceptual category." If this is not an
empty category, then it is likely filled with examples such as
parental punishment of a young child by giving a 'time-out' for
misbehavior.
9. This category includes violent acts occurring in a non-
domestic context that tend to sustain or perpetuate structural
inequality but are, all things considered, legitimate. This very well
66. These examples arise from patriarchal structural inequality. See Kersti A. Yllo
& Murray A. Straus, Patriarchy and Violence Against Wives: The Impact of Structural
and Normative Factors, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES, supra note 3, at
383, 394-95. Other examples may be grounded in other inequalities such as racism,
which could take the form of parental favoritism toward lighter skinned children in an
interracial family, or heterosexism, which could take the form of an abuser's threats to
"out" his or her gay, lesbian, or bisexual partner. Claire M. Renzetti, Violence and Abuse
Among Same-Sex Couples, in VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATE PARTNERS: PATTERNS,
CAUSES, AND EFFECTS 70, 74 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1997). See also LEMON, supra note
47, at 196-97 (quoting Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why Doesn't Anyone Talk About Gay and
Lesbian Domestic Violence?, 18 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 23, 31-32 (1996)).
67. For an example of the pub brawl as generic violence, see GELLEs, supra note 41,
at 93.
68. See, e.g., FIRESTONE, supra note 58, at 72-104 (advocating the abolition of the
status of childhood and implying that the adult-child structural inequality is
illegitimate).
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may be an empty category. Some might claim, however, that this
conceptual category is exemplified by a teacher spanking children
at school for misbehavior.
10. This category includes violent acts occurring in a domestic
context that do not tend to sustain or perpetuate structural
inequality and are, all things considered, legitimate. The classic
paradigm of this concept is the case of a battered wife who shoots
her abusive husband in self-defense.69 Further examples of this
category may include play fighting, such as pillow fighting, between
intimate partners or horseplay between siblings.
11. This category includes nonviolent acts occurring in a
domestic context that do not tend to sustain or perpetuate struc-
tural inequality and are, all things considered, legitimate. Examples
include hugging one's partner, playing a game with one's child, or
helping one's sibling clean the house.
12. This category includes nonviolent acts occurring in a
nondomestic context that tend to sustain or perpetuate structural
inequality but are, all things considered, legitimate. An example is
a teacher punishing a child at school by giving a 'time-out' for
misbehavior.
13. This category includes violent acts occurring in a non-
domestic context that do not tend to sustain or perpetuate struc-
tural inequality and are, all things considered, legitimate. Examples
include the stabbing of a stranger-attacker in self-defense or the
violent acts inherent to the game of rugby.
One relevant conceptual category is not represented in this
model: a violent act occurring in a domestic context, which tends to
sustain or perpetuate structural inequality, but is, all things
considered, legitimate. Many believe this to be an empty category. v
III. FouR ACCouNTs OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Four principal accounts of domestic violence currently operate
in the criminal justice system, academic literature, and advocacy
communities. This section explains the usage of the concept of
domestic violence under each account, and describes the nature of
the conflicts and similarities between competing accounts. In
addition to providing a brief overview of each account's approach to
69. For an example of the paradigm of the battered wife engaged in self-defense, see
RIcHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 90 (1988).
70. The author sympathizes with this position.
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domestic violence, this section utilizes the model developed in Part
II to explain what counts as domestic violence and which concepts
are most closely related to domestic violence under each account.
These accounts overlap considerably, and common usage often
jumps back and forth between various accounts depending upon the
context of a given discussion. Nevertheless, these accounts bear
significant differences, and in order to understand the literature and
policy debates regarding domestic violence, an appreciation of the
nuances of each is necessary.
A. Violence Account
The violence account is the most influential understanding of
domestic violence in the criminal justice and public health systems.
As its name suggests, this account highlights the importance of the
violence element in understanding domestic violence. Consistent
with this outlook, this account is often invoked to justify a strict,
formalistic law enforcement response to domestic violence, along the
lines represented by the slogan "domestic violence is a crime" " and
the call to take domestic violence seriously.
Structural inequality is not a necessary element for under-
standing domestic violence under the violence account. Rather,
domestic violence is most often viewed solely in terms of violence
and domesticity. In particular, this account emphasizes the
relevance of physical harm caused by violence which occurs in a
domestic context. 2 For example, law enforcement officers are
encouraged to think of themselves as engaged in "homicide preven-
tion," and every case of domestic violence is viewed as a potential
homicide. 3 Paradigms of domestic violence in this account include
71. E.g., CATRIONA MIRRLEES-BLACK, HOME OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FINDINGS
FROM A NEW BRITISH CRIME SURVEY SELF-COMPLETION QUESTIONNAIRE 63 (1999),
available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/horsl9l.pdf; COMM'N ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, AM. BAR ASS'N, MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.abanet.org/domviol/mrdv/identify.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006); Domestic
Violence Webpage for Bannock County, Idaho, http://www.co.bannock.id.us/dvisacri.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
72. See, e.g., World Health Organization, Violence Against Women, http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). The World Health
Organization's website regarding violence against women emphasizes that
"[i]nterpersonal violence was the tenth leading cause of death for women 15-44 years of
age." Id.
73. E.g., Governor Initiates Domestic Violence Homicide Prevention Task Force,
COALITION CONNECTION (Mich. Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence,
Okemos, Mich.) Feb. 2001, http://www.mcadsv.org/Archive/cc02_01.html. Michigan refers
to its domestic violence police specialists as its "Homicide Prevention Task Force." Id.
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domestic homicide, attempted homicide, and acts of violence which
cause permanent, disabling, or scarring physical injury."' Violence,
understood in terms of its physical consequences, is the element
which, if altered in nature or severity, controls the centrality of
these paradigm cases. Thus, a push or slap that does not result in
any physical injury would not be considered a central case of
domestic violence under this account. The only exception to this
generalization is where the push or slap is committed in a context
that ranks high on a 'lethality assessment index,' the measurement
tool that aims to predict the risk that a domestic violence offender
will kill his victim.7" Absent a high threat of lethality, a simple push
or slap that causes no injury will be highly marginalized, to the
point that it likely will not be conceptualized as a 'real' case of
domestic violence.
In terms of the concepts charted on the explanatory model, the
violence account understands domestic violence as encompassing
both [1] and [3]. This account ultimately is unsatisfying, however,
because it does not make any distinction between domestic violence
in its strong sense [1] and its weak sense [3].76 The concept most
closely related to domestic violence is generic violence [6], which
serves as the standard by which domestic violence and all institu-
tional responses to domestic violence are measured. In other words,
taking domestic violence seriously under the violence account
amounts to treating domestic violence similarly to generic violence."
The violence account marks an important historical turn in the
treatment of domestic violence by the criminal justice system.7" This
74. See, e.g., Phyllis W. Sharp & Jacquelyn Campbell, Health Consequences for
Victims of Violence in Intimate Relationships, in VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS,
supra note 3, at 163, 166-67.
75. See NEIL WEBSDALE, NATL ONLINE RESOURCE CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, LETHALITY ASSESSMENT TooLs: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (2000), http://www.vaw
net.org/DomesticViolence/Research/VAWnetDocs/AR-lethality.pdf.
76. The failure to distinguish between the strong and weak senses of domestic
violence results from the violence account's omission of structural inequality in
conceptualizing domestic violence.77. Ironically, treating domestic violence similarly to generic violence results in
extremely high dismissal rates in domestic violence cases because prosecutions are
unlikely to proceed absent victim support even in generic violence cases. See Antonia
Cretney et al., Criminalizing Assault: The Failure of the 'Offense Against Society'Model,
34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 15, 15 (1994) ("[The police] will seldom take the matter further
unless the victim demonstrates a firm commitment to the prosecution process."). Thus,
an inherent limitation exists in the violence account's call to take domestic violence
seriously, due to its unsatisfying conceptualization of domestic violence as closely related
to generic violence.
78. The violence account overcomes the historical barriers to prosecution and
accountability. See FAITH ROBERTSON ELLIOT, GENDER, FAMILY AND SOCIETY 179 (1996).
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account, however, has been rightly criticized by feminist advocates
for its failure to consider structural inequality in conceptualizing
domestic violence.7" The bulk of these criticisms have been ex-
pressed in debates regarding dual arrests.s" Complaints that strict,
formalistic crime control policies have resulted in high numbers of
domestic violence victims being arrested8' are often, in essence,
complaints against the violence account, which fails to appreciate
the role of structural inequality in understanding what counts as
domestic violence.82
B. Domestic Account
The domestic account is the most influential account of dom-
estic violence in social science academic literature and is the
dominant approach to empirical research in the United States.83 The
research performed by its adherents has produced the world's most
widely cited statistics and statistical measurement model regarding
the prevalence of domestic violence, the Conflict Tactics Scale
(CTS).84
There are two important aspects to understanding the domestic
account: its theoretical approach to answering the question of what
counts as domestic violence and its methodological approach to
measuring domestic violence for the purpose of empirical research.
79. See id. at 177 (noting that feminists accept the "proposition that men's violence
and sexual abuse are both products of, and mechanisms for sustaining, a universal
patriarchal social order").
80. Dual arrest occurs when both victim and batterer are arrested in cases where the
batterer subjected the victim to domestic violence in its strong sense [1], and the victim
committed domestic violence in its weak sense [3], or more problematically, merely
defended herself against the batterer's attack [10]. See Coker, Race, Poverty, and the
Crime-Centered Response, supra note 4, at 1332.
81. See, e.g., id. ("Mandatory arrest policies have dramatically increased the number
of women arrested.).
82. Ironically, some of those who criticize law enforcement for arresting and
prosecuting victims who engage in retaliatory violence [3] are the same folks who praise
the police for taking domestic violence seriously by enacting mandatory arrest laws
grounded in a violence account. See, e.g., Wanless, supra note 4, at 545, 558-59.
83. Key works reflecting this account include GELLES, supra note 41; GELLES &
STRAUS, supra note 69; MURRAY A. STRAUS, RICHARD J. GELLES & SUSAN STEINMETZ,
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1981); Murray A. Straus,
Measuring Intrafamily Conflict and Violence: The Conflict Tactics (CT) Scales, 41 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 75 (1979); Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles, Societal Change and
Change in Family Violence from 1975 to 1985 as Revealed by Two National Surveys, in
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES, supra note 3, at 113; Murray A. Straus et
al., The Revised Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS2): Development and Preliminary
Psychometric Data, 17 J. FAM. ISSUES 283 (1996).
84. See, e.g., Straus, supra note 83; Straus et al., supra note 83.
20061
324 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 12:301
Theoretically, the domestic account emphasizes the role of the
domestic relationship as the crucial element in understanding what
counts as domestic violence. 5 Like the violence account, the
domestic account ultimately is unsatisfying because it treats
structural inequality as relatively superfluous to understanding
what counts as domestic violence. As Elliot notes, this account
"takes 'the family' rather than gender inequality as its [primary]
unit of analysis." 6 It views patriarchal structural inequality as
merely "one factor among many, and minimises the importance of
men's power in structuring family relationships."8 Paradigms of
domestic violence under this account are more or less central based
on the nature of the domestic relationship at issue. Central cases
include spousal assault 8 and child abuse, while cases involving
cousins or platonic roommates, for example, are highly marginalized
- to the point that such cases are unlikely to be understood as 'real'
cases of domestic violence.89 Unlike the violence account, however,
centrality under the domestic account remains unaffected by the
presence or absence of resulting physical harm or the lethality
risk.9"
Methodologically, adherents to the domestic account employ
an empirical research tool called the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS).9'
The CTS is a questionnaire developed by family violence researcher,
Murray Straus, and his colleagues at the University of New
Hampshire during the 1970s.92 With slight revision, the CTS re-
mains one of the most widely used quantitative empirical research
methods for measuring the overall prevalence and gender preva-
lence93 of domestic violence.94 The CTS is a tick-the-box type survey
85. For this reason, proponents of the domestic account often refer to domestic
violence as "intimate violence," e.g., Linda Mills, Intimate Violence as Intimate: The
Journey and a Path, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 461 (2003); "family violence," e.g., THE
DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH, supra note 3; or
"violence in the home," see supra note 38, thereby emphasizing the importance of the
domestic context in understanding domestic violence.
86. ELLIOT, supra note 78, at 176-77.
87. Id. at 177.
88. The term 'spousal assault' is used intentionally, rather than 'wife assault,' in
order to clarify that the domestic account regards wife assault and husband assault
equally as paradigmatic of domestic violence. See, e.g., Steinmetz, supra note 3, at 501.
89. See, e.g., GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 69, at 59-62.
90. See id. at 54-55 (arguing that paradigms of domestic violence range "from
[spanking] to murder" and each should be understood as equally central).
91. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
92. DEKESEREDY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 1.
93. 'Gender prevalence,' as used herein, is the rate at which males commit domestic
violence against females as compared to the rate at which females commit domestic
violence against males. See supra note 3.
94. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 27.
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in which domestic violence is understood as arising out of symmetri-
cal interpersonal conflicts that the parties dysfunctionally attempt
to resolve through the use of violence.9" This context of symmetry is
well reflected in the introduction to the CTS:
No matter how well a couple gets along, there are times
when they disagree on major decisions, get annoyed about
something the other person does, or just have spats or fights
because they're in a bad mood or tired or for some other reason.
They also use many different ways of trying to settle their
differences. I'm going to read some things that you and your
([spouse]/partner) might have done when you had a dispute, and
would first like you to tell me for each one how often you did it
in the past year."
The CTS goes on to ask questions that capture data regarding
physical acts committed by the respondents, without asking
questions that might provide relevant data upon which to evaluate
the normative legitimacy of the acts.97 For example, the CTS fails to
gather data that might facilitate distinctions between unprovoked
assaults and self-defense" and distinctions between attacks and
play fighting.99 The CTS's tick-the-box approach excludes empirical
evidence of, for example, asymmetrical power relations that might
facilitate relevant normative distinctions in deciding whether an act
counts as domestic violence."°
Employing the explanatory model once more, the domestic
account understands domestic violence (theoretically) as including
both [1] and [3]. 1 The concepts that are most closely related to
domestic violence are domestic abuse [4] and domestic conflict [7]. 12
Methodologically, the CTS fails to differentiate between [1], [3], and
95. See id.
96. Straus, supra note 83, at 87.
97. DEKESEREDY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 1-3.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Currie, supra note 3, at 106 (reporting on research that included in-depth
interviews as a follow-up to administration of the CTS survey and, through the
interviews, discovering that some playful acts, such as tossing a stuffed teddy bear
during a play fight, were counted as "serious violence" under the CTS scales).
100. See DEKEsEREDY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 2-3.
101. As with the violence account, structural inequality does not play a necessary role
in conceptualizing domestic violence in the domestic account. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text. Thus, the domestic account draws no strong distinction between
domestic violence in its strong sense [1] and weak sense [3].
102. Again, because structural inequality is the only distinguishing characteristic
between [4] and [7], the distinction between these conceptual categories is not strongly
drawn in the domestic account.
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[10] in operationalizing its concept of domestic violence. In other
words, the CTS lumps together violence committed in a domestic
context which might be considered legitimate, such as self-defense
[10], with both types of illegitimate violence in a domestic context,
[1] and [3], and counts them all equally as domestic violence.
The domestic account's methodological conflation of legitimate
and illegitimate acts under the heading of domestic violence is both
linguistically confusing and conceptually problematic. It is linguisti-
cally confusing because the domestic account's operationalization of
the term domestic violence conflicts with common usage. Under
common usage, the term domestic violence includes only illegitimate
acts, and does not include legitimate acts (i.e., acts that are justified,
all things considered). For example, when a battered woman shoots
and kills her abusive husband in self-defense, and her actions are
justified, she would not typically be characterized as having
committed domestic violence nor is the deceased abuser typically
characterized as a victim of domestic violence.'°3 Indeed, proponents
of the domestic account adopt this usage as well,' which makes
their methodological operationalization of domestic violence all the
more confusing and unsatisfying.
The domestic account's methodological conflation of legitimate
and illegitimate acts is conceptually problematic because it suggests
a fundamental inconsistency between theory and method in the
domestic account. Theoretically, the domestic account adopts a
legitimist account of domestic violence, consistent with the usage
described above.0' However, the CTS fails to operationalize the
theoretical distinction between illegitimate acts of violence in a
domestic setting and legitimate acts of violence in a domestic
setting. In theory, the domestic account understands the former as
domestic violence and the latter as something else, such as self-
defense, but the domestic account's preferred research methodology,
the CTS, fails to make this distinction." 6 The CTS's failure to
operationalize this distinction means that adherents to the domestic
account measure a much wider phenomenon in their empirical re-
search than that which they theorize is problematic. 17
103. These linguistic conventions reflect the correct use, at least partially, of the
concept domestic violence, as reflected in the analysis set out in Part II, wherein
domestic violence in its strong sense [1] and weak sense [3] are illegitimate (i.e.,
unjustified).
104. See, e.g., GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 69, at 90.
105. See, e.g., id.
106. DEKESEREDY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 3.
107. This inconsistency has formed the target for a wide body of literature critical of
the CTS methodology: Berk et al., supra note 3; Patricia Mahoney, Linda M. Williams
& Carolyn M. West, Violence Against Women by Intimate Relationship Partners, in
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Straus, father of the domestic account and creator of the CTS,
acknowledges this failure, while dismissing critics with the claim
that his approach is justified:
The criticism that the CTS does not take into account the
context and meaning of the acts is analogous to criticizing a
reading ability test for not identifying the reasons a child reads
poorly ....
Straus's response to his critics demonstrates that he has fundamen-
tally misapprehended the nature of the critique leveled at his CTS
methodology. Rather, a proper analogy is found in a reading test
which operationalizes the concept 'reading' in such an overly broad
manner as to include acts such as reciting the letters of each word
in its concept of 'reading' and' which, moreover, fails to distinguish
reading-as-pronunciation (the sense in which I can still manage to
'read' French) and reading-as-comprehension (the sense in which I
can no longer read French because I have forgotten the meaning of
the words). A reading test that fails to make these distinctions is a
test open to criticism.
C. Structural Inequality Account
The structural inequality account is the standard conceptualiza-
tion of domestic violence within the advocacy community, and it
informs a great deal of empirical research on domestic violence,
particularly in England. 109 Unlike the violence account and domestic
account, the structural inequality account, as its name suggests,
does consider structural inequality in conceptualizing domestic
SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 143 (Claire M. Renzetti, Jeffrey L. Edleson
& Raquel Kennedy Bergen eds., 2001); Margolin, supra note 3; Saunders, supra note 3;
YU6, Through a Feminist Lens, supra note 3; Yll, Using a Feminist Approach, supra
note 3. Occasionally, collections include contributions reflecting both domestic accounts
and critiques. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3; ISSUES IN
INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 3.
108. Straus et al., supra note 83, at 285.
109. The leading proponents of the structural inequality account in empirical research
are the Manchester-based Rebecca and Russell Dobash. Key works reflecting this
account include DOBASH & DOBASH, VIOLENCEAGAINSTWIVES, supra note 3; R. EMERSON
DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1992); Dobash
& Dobash, The Context-Specific Approach, supra note 3; Dobash & Dobash, Women's
Violence to Men, supra note 3. Research based on a structural inequality account of
domestic violence has also been widely conducted in the United States. See, e.g.,
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 3; Dasgupta, supra note 3; Y116,
Using a Feminist Approach, supra note 3.
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violence."' Under this account, however, structural inequality is a
necessary element in determining what counts as domestic
violence."' In other words, violent acts occurring in a domestic
context are only considered domestic violence if they also sustain or
perpetuate a structural inequality.' 2 This account, therefore, is
unsatisfying due to its failure to recognize domestic violence in its
weak sense [3].
Structural inequality account-based research in the United
States has produced perhaps the most influential depiction of the
dynamics of domestic violence: the power and control wheel."1
3
According to the power and control wheel, structural inequalities
(power and control) form the core of domestic violence, while abusive
behaviors form a pinwheel spreading out from this core, and
physical/sexual violence are presented as existing at the outer edges
of the wheel."4 The purpose of depicting domestic violence in this
way is: (1) to emphasize the central role of structural inequality in
understanding what counts as domestic violence; (2) to establish
conceptual connections between different types of abusive behaviors;
and (3) to suggest that abusive control may be as much, if not more,
of a problem than acts of physical violence. '
In terms of the concepts charted on this article's explanatory
model, the only sense of domestic violence recognized under the
structural inequality account is domestic violence in its strong sense
[1]. Domestic violence in its weak sense [3] is not understood as
domestic violence."' The concepts most closely related to domestic
violence are those illegitimate acts which sustain or perpetuate
structural inequalities, even when the acts do not involve violence
[4, 5] and even when they do not occur in a domestic context [2, 5].
Under most versions of the structural inequality account, patriarchy
is the primary concern, and it is considered illegitimate in all of its
forms." 7 Given this primary focus on patriarchy, the structural in-
equality account typically perceives a very close family resemblance
110. See, e.g., Y116, Using a Feminist Approach, supra note 3, at 277-78.
111. See, e.g., id.
112. See, e.g., id.
113. Duluth Abuse Intervention Project, supra note 60.
114. Id.
115. Id..
116. The failure of the structural inequality account to recognize domestic violence in
its weak sense conflicts with this article's account and has drawn criticism from
proponents of the domestic account, who do not draw any distinction between domestic
violence in its strong sense and weak sense. E.g., Straus, Domestic Violence by Women,
supra note 3, at 21.
117. E.g., ELLIOT, supra note 78, at 177.
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between domestic violence [1] and stranger rape [2]."8 This
resemblance is grounded in the belief that both domestic violence
and stranger rape tend to sustain and perpetuate men's patriarchal
control over women." 9
Proponents of the patriarchal structural inequality account
have been criticized for discounting the relevance of other forms of
structural inequality, such as racism, heterosexism, and economic
inequality. 2 ° Furthermore, they have been criticized for viewing the
heterosexual family as a site of oppression for women.' 2 ' Such criti-
cisms come in two flavors: an external critique and an internal
critique. The external critique is politically conservative and based
on the joint claims that patriarchy is legitimate, and thus the
heterosexual family as traditionally constructed under patriarchy
is not problematic.'22 The internal critique is politically progressive
and based on the joint claims that the family often serves as "a site
of resistance and solidarity against racism for women of colour" and,
therefore, "does not hold a central place in accounting for women's
subordination." 1
23
D. Johnson's Account
In the mid-1990s, Michael Johnson, an American sociologist,
attempted to transcend the debates between proponents of the
domestic and structural inequality accounts by developing a
radically new approach to operationalizing the concept of domestic
violence in empirical research. 24 His primary innovation was to
divide domestic violence into two distinct concepts: (1) patriarchal
terrorism (later called intimate terrorism), and (2) common couple
violence (later called situational couple violence). 25
118. This resemblance is exemplified in feminist advocacy organizations that target
domestic violence alongside nondomestic sexual assault. For examples, see Feminist
Majority Foundation, Domestic Violence Resources, http://www.feminist.org/911/crisis.
html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). Coalitions organized around these two concepts are
particularly prevalent in the United States, which has no fewer than eighteen joint
domestic violence and sexual assault coalitions at the state and federal levels. Id.
119. See DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 191-94 (1982).
120. See, e.g., ELLIOT, supra note 78, at 182.
121. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 85, at 462.
122. For a critique of this position, see Currie, supra note 3, at 98.
123. WALBY, supra note 59, at 14 (citing BELL HooKs, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM
MARGIN TO CENTER (1984)).
124. See Michael P. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence:
Two Forms of Violence Against Women, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 283 (1995).
125. Id. at 284-85. Johnson subsequently changed the names of his key concepts to
"intimate terrorism" and "situational couple violence" so as not to "beg the question of
the connections with patriarchy that are so clear in heterosexual relationships (but not
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The key to Johnson's analytic approach lies in a methodological
critique of the selection bias affecting the empirical research
conducted by proponents of both accounts. Research subjects in
studies conducted by proponents of the structural inequality account
are typically drawn from women's shelters/refuges, police reports,
and court cases.12 The bias inherent in such sampling techniques
has given rise to criticism levied by proponents of the domestic
account, who in turn claim that their random sampling techniques
are free from bias.127 Johnson explains, however, that the domestic
account's samples are equally biased, because proponents of the
domestic account "do not in fact interview random samples," but
instead "interview those who do not refuse to be interviewed." 12
8
With refusal rates of up to forty percent, the domestic account's
sampling technique systematically excludes large populations
among whom power and control may be most pronounced.
129
Based on these bilateral sampling errors, and the further
observation that the different sampling techniques target "virtually
non-overlapping populations," Johnson hypothesized that each type
of research is best understood as a measure of different types of
domestic violence. 3 ° The first type of domestic violence Johnson
identified, called "patriarchal terrorism" or "intimate terrorism," "'
is measured by research based on a structural inequality account of
domestic violence.'32 Common characteristics of intimate terrorism
include the following: (1) it is overwhelmingly committed by men
against women; (2) it appears to be motivated by men's desire to
achieve (patriarchal) power and control over their intimate part-
ners; (3) there is usually a clear distinction between victim and
so clear in same sex relationships in which there is an intimate terrorist)" and to avoid
"the risk of trivialization [inherent in the term] 'common couple violence."' E-mail from
Michael P. Johnson, Associate Professor of Sociology, Women's Studies, and African and
African American Studies, Pennsylvania State University, to Michelle Madden Dempsey,
Lecturer in Law, University of Oxford (Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with author).
126. E.g., Elizabeth A. Stanko, Unmasking What Should Be Seen: A Study of the
Prevalence of Domestic Vwlence in the London Borough of Hackney, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: GLOBAL RESPONSES 227, 232 (Edna Erez & Kathy Laster eds., 2000).
127. See generally Straus, Injury and Frequency, supra note 3, cited in Michael P.
Johnson, Conflict and Control: Images of Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic
Violence, in COUPLES IN CONFLICT 95, 96 (Alan Booth, Ann Crouter & Mari Clements
eds., 2001), available at http'/www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/m/p/mpj/boothfinal2.htm.
128. Johnson, supra note 127, at 97.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Johnson uses the term "intimate terrorism" in his later work. See Michael P.
Johnson & Kathleen J. Ferraro, Research on Domestic Violence in the 1990s: Making
Distinctions, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 948, 949 (2000).
132. Johnson, supra note 127, at 97.
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nonvictim, in part because persistent violence and abuse are likely,
over time, to suppress the victim's efforts to fight back; and (4) the
violence tends to escalate over time. 3' The second type of violence,
"common couple violence" or "situational couple violence," is mea-
sured by domestic account-based research, and its common charac-
teristics include the following: (1) it is committed by both men and
women in roughly equal numbers; (2) it appears to be motivated by
a desire "to get one's way in a particular conflict situation, within a
relationship in which there is not a general pattern of power and
control"; (3) the distinction between victim and nonvictim often
breaks down since the violence is more likely to be mutual and
reciprocal between the parties; and (4) the violence tends to be
intermittent and de-escalate over time."& Subsequent to drawing
this principal distinction, Johnson identified an additional type of
violence which may take place in a domestic context: "violent
resistance," in which victims of intimate terrorism use physical
violence against their batterers, for example, when battered women
kill their abusive husbands.1
35
In terms of the concepts charted on this article's explanatory
model, Johnson's intimate terrorism corresponds to domestic
violence in its strong sense [1], while Johnson's situational couple
violence and violent resistance, when illegitimate, correspond
conceptually to domestic violence in its weak sense [3]. Finally,
legitimate violent resistance corresponds conceptually to the
legitimate use of violence in a domestic context [10].
Johnson's account draws a number of appropriate and neces-
sary distinctions in conceptualizing domestic violence. In theory, his
account is consistent with the analysis of domestic violence in this
article, insofar as his distinction between intimate terrorism and
situational couple violence mirrors the distinction between domestic
violence in its strong sense [1] and weak sense [3], as presented in
this article. Thus, this article's theoretical account of domestic
violence is largely consistent with Johnson's key distinctions. Yet
the account of domestic violence offered in this article goes further
than Johnson's, insofar as it examines the underlying conceptual
elements that inform the relevant distinctions: violence, domes-
ticity, and structural inequality. Additionally, this account goes
further than Johnson's insofar as it analyzes the conceptual
resemblances between domestic violence and key related concepts,
133. Id. at 97, 101.
134. Id. at 97-98.
135. Id. at 101.
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such as stranger rape [2], domestic abuse [4], sexual harassment [5],
generic violence [6], domestic conflict [7], and domestic self-defense
[10].
CONCLUSION
This article purports to analyze the concept of domestic
violence, but does not claim to resolve the current debates regarding
domestic violence in the sociological or legal literature. Rather, the
analysis set forth herein is intended to add clarity to these debates
and enable those engaged in such debates to move forward more
productively.
This article has analyzed the concept of domestic violence, along
with several of its related concepts, and employed this analysis to
examine and critique several principal accounts of domestic violence
in legal and sociological literature. Rather than merely stipulating
definitions in an attempt to make sense of conflicting empirical
research, as Johnson does, this article has presented a philosophical
analysis of domestic violence in order to clarify the conceptual and
normative issues upon which these conflicts are based. This analysis
is intended to facilitate a more productive and engaged debate
regarding the criminal justice system's response to domestic
violence by sorting out which disagreements arise from a failure to
join issue and which disagreements evidence deeper philosophical
conflicts. In other words, this analysis will help people embroiled in
these debates to discuss the real issues more clearly rather than
simply talking past one another.
This article has resisted the "recipe approach" to understanding
domestic violence.'36 Instead, it has presented a philosophical
analysis that, briefly stated, goes as follows:
1. Domestic violence and its related concepts consist of complex
intersections of three elements: violence, domesticity, and
structural inequality.
2. Domestic violence has two senses. In its strong sense, domestic
violence reflects the intersection of violence, domesticity, and
structural inequality. In its weak sense, domestic violence
reflects only the intersection of violence and domesticity.
3. In order for the concept of domestic violence to be correctly
applied, the act in question must be illegitimate (i.e., unjusti-
fied, all things considered).
136. For explanation of the "recipe approach," see supra Part I.B.
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Notably, this article has presented a detailed explanatory model
of domestic violence that reflects the analysis of domestic violence
and its key related concepts set forth herein. This model has
enabled an explanation and critique of four influential accounts of
domestic violence: the violence account, the domestic account, the
structural inequality account, and Johnson's account. Each ac-
count's general theoretical approach to domestic violence has been
evaluated based on how well it corresponds to the analysis of
domestic violence set forth herein.137 The violence and domestic
accounts are found to be unsatisfactory because they fail to recog-
nize the relevance of structural inequality in conceptualizing
domestic violence. This failure leads these accounts to conflate
domestic violence in its strong and weak senses. The structural
inequality account is also found to be unsatisfactory because it fails
to recognize that the concept of domestic violence can be correctly
applied even when the violent act does not tend to sustain or
perpetuate structural inequality. This failure leads this account to
ignore domestic violence in its weak sense. In contrast to the first
three accounts, Johnson's account is found to be largely consistent
with the philosophical analysis set forth herein. However, the
analysis of domestic violence in this article improves upon Johnson's
account by illuminating the conceptual elements that inform his
basic distinctions and by providing an account of the resemblances
between domestic violence and its related concepts.
Hopefully this article has gone some way toward clarifying the
nature of domestic violence and its related concepts. If successful,
the analysis set forth herein has provided important insights into
the elements that underpin these concepts and the analytic relation
among these concepts. In doing so, this account takes a significant
step toward providing Raphael's longed-for "full and accurate
definition of domestic violence."' 38
137. This article also has critiqued the domestic account's methodological
operationalization of the concept of domestic violence. See supra notes 86-108 and
accompanying text.
138. Raphael, supra note 1, at 1361.
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